List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation

Figure 2.1: Mixed security strategy of P1 for the matrix game (2.20).
Figure 2.2: Mixed security strategy of P2 for the matrix game (2.20).
Figure 2.3: Mixed security strategy of P1 for the matrix game (2.21).
Figure 2.4: Two zero-sum games in extensive form differing only in the information available to P2.
Figure 2.5: An extensive form that admits a saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies.
Figure 2.6: A game in extensive form that admits a mixed (behavioral)-strategy saddle-point solution.
Figure 2.7: Two multi-act zero-sum games which are not feedback games.
Figure 2.8: A zero-sum feedback game in extensive form.
Figure 2.9: A zero-sum multi-act game that does not admit a behavioral saddle-point solution.
Figure 2.10: A multi-act game of the delayed commitment type that admits a behavioral saddle-point solution.
Figure 2.11: A zero-sum single-act game in extensive form that incorporates a chance move.
Figure 2.12: A modified version of the zero-sum game of Fig. 2.11, with both players having access to nature s actual choice.
Figure 2.13: A zero-sum game in extensive form in which the tree enters an information set twice.
Figure 2.14: The function K.
Figure 2.15: Feedback game of Problem 11.
Figure 2.16: Feedback game of Problem 12.
Figure 2.17: The two-person dynamic game of Problem 17.
Figure 2.18:...

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