TABLE OF CONTENTS One premise of the Cold War was that the next war would be a nuclear one, and this led to the conclusion that reconnaissance missions in a post- nuclear exchange environment would be suicide for the aircrew due to the residual radiation. This assumption was validated by the experience of U.S. pilots who flew data-gathering missions over Bikini Atoll in the Pacific immediately after nuclear tests in 1946. Despite wearing lead-lined flight suits and having their aircraft washed down upon landing, radiation-related sickness occurred. Such bomb tests were also reconnoitered by de-manned B-17s under radio control. These missions introduced the "dirty" factor into considering which missions should best be delegated to unmanned aircraft.
The concept of using a robotic aircraft for reconnaissance evolved naturally during the mid-1950s from the cruise missile and target decoy roles in which they were already being used. The former demanded navigational accuracy to make them operationally viable, and the latter required a means of recovery for reuse to make them economically useful. Both attributes were necessary in a reconnaissance drone.
The reconnaissance mission itself, flown by single manned aircraft without escort or armament ("alone and unarmed") into hostile airspace, was traditionally a critical but high-attrition mission. As an illustration, during World War II, the American 3rd Reconnaissance Group lost over 25% of its pilots flying reconnaissance missions over North Africa during their initial months in theater in 1942. Compare this to a loss rate of 5.5% for American bomber crews...
