OVERVIEW

Ail radars must be able to operate in the presence of naturally occurring interference resulting from transmissions from other sources. Military radars must also operate in hostile environments, which consist of deliberate interference designed to degrade their performance [1]. This deliberate interference is called electronic countermeasures (ECM), and is traditionally divided into two categories: active ECM, consisting of noise and deception waveforms, and passive ECM, typically consisting of chaff and decoys.

Methods for mitigating the effects of naturally occurring interference are the subject of electromagnetic compatibility, which is treated elsewhere [196, 198]. Methods for countering ECM are called electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). The goal of ECCM is to raise the cost of ECM to the point where it is prohibitive [1] or, failing that goal, to pro vide an equal cost penalty for ail types of ECM, so that the radar is not vulnerable to a specifie type of ECM.

The topics of ECM and ECCM for monostatic radars are now treated exten-sively in the open literature [1, 105, 136, 192-197]. Specifically, ECM and ECCM techniques are Usted and described by Schleher [193], Van Brunt [192], and John-ston [195]. More importantly, their operating principies and effects are analyzed by Skolnik [1], Blake [136], Barton [105], Maksimov et al [196], Leonov and Fomichev [197], with the first, classic analysis given in Boyd et al. [195]. The pur-pose of this chapter is to extend the monostatic ECM and ECCM analyses to the bistatic radar case, with emphasis on the differences...